Whitepaper · v1.0 · November 2026
The omnibus account
for Solana traders
Trade Solana. Leave no wallet to follow.
- 01IntroductionPrivium is the omnibus account for Solana traders. Traders deposit into one shared Pool, hold their balances in an encrypted Ledger, and submit encrypted Intents that a trusted-execution Coprocessor crosses against each other at the oracle mid every batch. Only the net Residual of each pair reaches public liquidity, as one Jupiter swap from the Pool, and each batch ends with a Commit that the Solana program accepts after checking the enclave's signature and the conservation of every asset. This chapter states the problem Privium solves, the structure it borrows from equity brokerage, the two recent pieces of work that make that structure buildable on Solana, the market it serves, and what the rest of this paper contributes.9 pp
- 02System overviewThis chapter describes Privium as a whole before the following chapters take it apart. It introduces each actor and what that actor wants from the system, follows one trade from deposit to Exit, lays out where every piece of state lives and which trust domain protects it, and states the six properties that the rest of the paper proves: custody, confidentiality, unlinkability, liveness, price fairness and auditability by the owner.11 pp
- 03Cryptographic foundationsPrivium is built from a small set of standard primitives: a prime-order group, Pedersen commitments, twisted ElGamal encryption, Fiat-Shamir sigma protocols and Bulletproofs range proofs, AES-256-GCM, HPKE, binary Merkle trees, and two signature schemes. Each one is already deployed at scale, and most of them are the same objects Solana's ZK ElGamal proof stack verifies on chain today. This chapter fixes their exact form, states the security notions Privium uses, and proves the reductions on which the later chapters build: the confidential Ledger (Chapter 4), attestation (Chapter 5), threshold decryption and the Escape (Chapter 6), and Receipts (Chapter 11).12 pp
- 04The confidential LedgerThe Ledger is Privium's book of accounts: one balance per trader per asset, held as ciphertext, committed on chain as a single Merkle root, and advanced once per Crossing by a Commit. This chapter defines its leaves, its state transition function and its Commit, and proves the property everything else depends on: at every committed root, for every asset, the balances in the Ledger add up exactly to what the Pool's vaults hold for traders. The proof uses the Pedersen layer of each leaf and the integer bounds of Chapter 3, so conservation is checked on chain by the program, not taken on trust from the Coprocessor. The chapter closes with data availability, replay and nonce discipline, and the growth of the Ledger in bytes.13 pp
- 05Trusted execution and attestationThe Coprocessor is the one component of Privium that sees plaintext: it decrypts Intents and Ledger leaves, crosses orders, and re-encrypts the result. This chapter makes that power checkable. It follows an Intel TDX quote from the CPU's measurement registers to the Intel root, binds the Coprocessor's keys to its measured code through REPORTDATA, registers those keys on Solana by verifying the quote's ECDSA-P256 signatures with the secp256r1 precompile, and checks an Ed25519 signature on every Commit against them. It closes with AWS Nitro Enclaves, reproducible builds, key epochs, sealing through the Council, and upgrade by re-attestation. Threshold mechanics are in Chapter 6; the Ledger state the enclave signs is in Chapter 4.11 pp
- 06Threshold keys and the EscapeThe Council is the second root of Privium's trust and the only one custody rests on. It holds a single secret s in mathbbZell, split t-of-n among its members so that no coalition below the threshold learns anything about it. The Council has two duties. It releases the Ledger data key to enclaves the Registry has admitted (Chapter 5), and it runs the Escape: if no Commit lands within the liveness window W, it re-encrypts each owner's last committed balance to that owner alone, and the Pool program pays the owner out on a proof that never touches an enclave. This chapter builds the Council's key from first principles: Shamir sharing, Feldman and Pedersen verifiable sharing, distributed key generation, threshold decryption with proofs of correct decryption, re-encryption to a verified key, and proactive resharing as membership changes. It then specifies the Escape step by step and proves its safety and liveness. Group and proof preliminaries are in Chapter 3; the Ledger leaf whose Council handle the Escape decrypts is in Chapter 4.12 pp
- 07The Crossing engineThe Crossing is the unit of trading in Privium. Whenever it holds something to settle, as often as once every Δ slots, the Coprocessor takes the sealed Intents it holds, nets them pair by pair at the oracle mid, fills opposing size inside the Pool, and sends only what is left, the Residual, to public liquidity as one swap per pair. This chapter defines that procedure precisely and proves what it guarantees: netting is maximal, allocation within a batch is independent of arrival time and immune to splitting, every fill respects its limit, pairs settle independently and in any order, and the value a searcher can extract from a Crossing is bounded by the Residual alone. It closes with an expected-cost inequality that tells a trader when a Crossing beats a direct swap, and a worked example. The cryptography that seals Intents is in Chapter 3, the Ledger the Crossing writes into is in Chapter 4, and the on-chain instructions that execute the Residual and the Commit are in Chapter 9.13 pp
- 08UnlinkabilityConfidentiality hides what a balance holds; unlinkability hides whose it is. A trader in Privium deposits from one wallet, trades through sealed Intents, and exits to another, and the question this chapter answers is how well an observer can connect the two wallets, or connect either of them to the trades in between. We fix three adversaries, define the public transcript they see, and measure what it says about any one trader with Shannon entropy and min-entropy over the anonymity set. We then bound the three channels through which linkage leaks in any shielded pool (amounts, timing, and flow) and give the countermeasures that close each one: denominations, exit delays and Ring exits. The chapter ends with a formal unlinkability game and the theorem Privium achieves in it: the cryptographic layers leak nothing beyond a stated leakage function, and the statistical bounds of the earlier sections measure exactly what that function reveals.11 pp
- 09Solana program engineeringThe Pool is one Anchor program that custodies every deposited token, accepts each Commit, routes each Residual through Jupiter and pays every Exit and Escape. This chapter specifies it at audit depth: account layouts and seeds, each instruction with the accounts it locks and the checks it runs, the compute and byte budgets that set how much one Commit carries, and the write-lock design that keeps deposits, Intents and Commits parallel under Sealevel. The Ledger semantics are in Chapter 4, enclave registration in Chapter 5, the Escape protocol in Chapter 6 and the clearing math in Chapter 7. Solana constants are cited to current Solana and Agave sources; figures derived for Privium are marked "est.".12 pp
- 10The Coprocessor and the off-chain stackThe Coprocessor is the service that turns encrypted Intents into a committed Ledger root whenever there is something to settle, as often as once per batch interval. It runs as a Rust service inside a TEE, and around it sits an untrusted host stack: a relayer that lands transactions, a reader for Pyth's price accounts on Solana, clients for Jupiter's Price API and Router, a ciphertext store, an indexer, and the TypeScript SDK through which a trader places an order in one call. This chapter specifies that stack: how the service is cut between trusted and untrusted code, how one Crossing runs, how every input from the host is bound on chain so the enclave never has to trust it, how Commits land and recover, and how the enclave image is built so anyone can reproduce its measurement. Attestation and key custody are in Chapter 5, the Escape in Chapter 6, the Crossing math in Chapter 7 and the program in Chapter 9.11 pp
- 11Selective disclosure and ReceiptsA confidential account still has to be shown to the people who need to see it: an accountant closing a tax year, a fund administrator, a follower checking a caller's record. Privium gives the trader two instruments for this. Viewing keys open the trader's own Ledger entries to a chosen reader, scoped by asset, by period or down to a single entry. Receipts go the other way: instead of opening the data, the trader asks the Coprocessor for a signed statement about it (realized PnL over a period, volume, a return above a threshold), which anyone can verify against the chain and which names no wallet. This chapter defines both, with the key hierarchy, the PnL rules and the properties each provides, and the controls institutions attach to their accounts, including auditor keys in the form Helius Rings introduced 1.11 pp
- 12Economics and $PRVPrivium charges one fee, a rate φ on the notional of every fill, and its economics come down to a comparison the trader makes on each order: what this trade costs through the Pool against what it costs as a swap from the trader's own wallet. This chapter writes that comparison as math. It separates the three ways a unit of an order can be executed (crossed inside the Pool, routed as part of the Residual, or swapped directly), derives the crossing rate as a function of the flow a Crossing sees, and shows how the cost of trading through Privium falls as that flow grows. It then follows the fee out of the Ledger to the token's launch wallet, through a market buyback of $PRV and a burn, and describes how the token launched. It closes with the build plan as milestones.9 pp